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Review of the 2006 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit
Abstract

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) delivered only seven
precedential trademark opinions in 2006. This small proportion of trademark cases is consistent with the
court’s docket in recent years. This year, the court addressed a range of interesting substantive issues including
trade dress configuration, reverse passing off, and genericism. Notably, two of the seven precedential decisions
involved plant names protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act. The Federal Circuit decided only one case
in 2006 where the primary issue was procedural, rather than substantive. In that case, discussed below, the
Federal Circuit sided with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”), and affirmed its decision on
the applicability of the res judicata doctrine. This year proved once again that appellants face a stiff challenge
in convincing the Federal Circuit to overturn the Board’s findings and determinations. Of the eight Board
decisions appealed to the Federal Circuit, only one was overturned. Also, the Federal Circuit affirmed rulings
by a federal district court and the International Trade Commission (“ITC”). This year, the Federal Circuit
affirmed in every trademark decision it published. In 2006, as in years past, the Federal Circuit has designated
a good portion of its trademark decisions as not citable precedent. Four out of the total eleven trademark cases
were unpublished. All four non-precedential decisions dealt with the application of the In re E.I. DuPont de
Nemours &amp; Co. factors for likelihood of confusion.
Keywords

Federal Circuit, Trademark, Trade dress configuration, Reverse passing off, Genericism

This area summary is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol56/iss4/4

TRADEMARK.OFFTOPRINTER

4/7/2007 11:20:35 AM

REVIEW OF THE 2006 TRADEMARK
DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
CHRISTINE HAIGHT FARLEY∗
GERI L. HAIGHT∗∗
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction.........................................................................................988
I. Substantive Trademark Issues ....................................................989
A. Appeals from Districts Courts ...............................................989
1. Reverse passing off............................................................989
2. Trademark damages .........................................................993
B. Appeals from the Board ........................................................995
1. Trade dress........................................................................995
2. Genericness .......................................................................999
3. Likelihood of confusion .................................................1003
C. Appeals from the International Trade Commission .........1005
II. Procedural Issues ......................................................................1007
A. Appeals from the Board ......................................................1007
1. Res judicata .....................................................................1007
III. Unpublished Opinions .............................................................1010
A. Likelihood of Confusion .....................................................1012
1. Hart v. New York Yankees Partnership ............................. 1012
2. Miguel Torres, S.A. v. Bodegas Muga, S.A. ...................... 1013
3. El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc....................... 1017
4. Stoller v. Sutech U.S.A., Inc. ........................................... 1019
Conclusion .........................................................................................1022

∗
Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, American
University Washington College of Law. B.A., Binghamton University; J.D., SUNY Buffalo
School of Law; L.L.M., Columbia Law School; J.S.D., Columbia Law School. I would like
to thank Peter Randolph for his invaluable research assistance and the editors of the
American University Law Review for inviting me to participate in this issue and for their
excellent editing. Please send comments to cfarley@wcl.american.edu.
∗∗
Partner in the Litigation and Intellectual Property sections of the Bostonbased law firm Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C. (“Mintz Levin”). B.A.,
State University of New York at Plattsburgh; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law I am
grateful for the assistance of Wynter Lavier, currently a third-year law student at
Northeastern University School of Law and an incoming litigation associate at Mintz
Levin, who skillfully researched the substantive issues presented in this Article.

987

TRADEMARK.OFFTOPRINTER

988

4/7/2007 11:20:35 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“Federal Circuit”) delivered only seven precedential trademark
1
opinions in 2006. This small proportion of trademark cases is
2
consistent with the court’s docket in recent years. This year, the
court addressed a range of interesting substantive issues including
3
4
5
trade dress configuration, reverse passing off, and genericism.
Notably, two of the seven precedential decisions involved plant names
6
protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act.
The Federal Circuit decided only one case in 2006 where the
7
primary issue was procedural, rather than substantive. In that case,
8
discussed below, the Federal Circuit sided with the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (“the Board”), and affirmed its decision on the
9
applicability of the res judicata doctrine.
This year proved once again that appellants face a stiff challenge in
convincing the Federal Circuit to overturn the Board’s findings and
determinations. Of the eight Board decisions appealed to the
10
11
Federal Circuit, only one was overturned. Also, the Federal Circuit
1. Go Med. Indus. Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In
re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Syngenta Seed, Inc. v. Delta
Cotton Co-op, Inc., 457 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2006); M2 Software, Inc. v. M2
Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha v.
Thinksharp, Inc., 448 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 444 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
2. See Stephen R. Baird, 2005 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 55 AM. U.
L. REV. 1263, 1263 (2006) (stating that six precedential trademark cases were
decided by the Federal Circuit in 2005); Bruce J. Goldner & Kenneth A. Plevan, 2004
Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1181, 1183 nn.7, 8
(2005) (citing four precedential opinions involving trademark issues delivered by the
Federal Circuit in 2004); Roberta Horton & Catherine Rowland, 2003 Trademark Law
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 909, 910 n.1 (2004) (indicating that
the Federal Circuit decided eleven precedential trademark cases in that “particularly
active” year); Robert Penchina, 2002 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 999, 1000 nn.1, 2 (2003) (stating the Federal Circuit issued
precedential opinions in a total of seven trademark cases in 2002); Andrew Hartman
& Lisa K. Koenig, 2001 Federal Circuit Trademark Roundup, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 74876 (2002) (citing seven precedntial trademark cases decided by the Federal Circuit
in 2001).
3. In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957.
4. Syngenta Seed, Inc., 471 F.3d 1269.
5. In re Pennington Seed, 466 F.3d 1053.
5. Id.; Syngenta Seed, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-Op, 457 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
7. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha, 448 F.3d 1368.
8. See infra Section II.A.
9. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha, 448 F.3d at 1372-73.
10. In re Pennington Seed, 466 F.3d 1053; M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc.,
450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha, 448 F.3d 1368; In re
Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006); El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc.,
201 F. App’x 773 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Stoller v. Sutech U.S.A., Inc., 199 F. App’x 954
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12

affirmed rulings by a federal district court and the International
13
Trade Commission (“ITC”). This year, the Federal Circuit affirmed
14
in every trademark decision it published.
In 2006, as in years past, the Federal Circuit has designated a good
15
portion of its trademark decisions as not citable precedent. Four
16
out of the total eleven trademark cases were unpublished. All four
non-precedential decisions dealt with the application of the In re E.I.
17
18
DuPont de Nemours & Co. factors for likelihood of confusion.
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Appeals from District Courts
1. Reverse passing off
19
Syngenta Seed, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-op, Inc. is the first of two cases
20
decided this year that deal with seed names. This case involved a
reverse palming off claim where the Federal Circuit needed to decide
whether the evidence sufficiently supported the jury’s verdicts of
21
infringement under the Plant Variety Protection Act (“PVPA”) and
22
confusion or injury under the Lanham Act. Syngenta Seeds, Inc. is
an international agribusiness that produces, inter alia, commercial
23
crop seeds.
This litigation concerned one such variety of seed

(Fed. Cir. 2006); Hart v. N.Y. Yankees P’ship, 184 F. App’x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Miguel Torres, S.A. v. Bodegas Muga, S.A., 176 F. App’x 124 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
11. Stoller, 199 F. App’x 954.
12. Go Med. Indus. Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
13. Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 444 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
14. In re Pennington Seed, 466 F.3d 1053; Go Med. Indus., 471 F.3d 1264; Syngenta
Seed, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Co-op, Inc., 457 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2006); M2 Software,
Inc., 450 F.3d 1378; Bourdeau Bros., Inc., 444 F.3d 1317; In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957.
15. See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1444 (2004) (arguing that not publishing
opinions amounts to private judging, a scandal that masks the true reasoning and
analysis behind the opinions). Professor Pether notes that the non-publication of
opinions makes them “difficult to find” and diminishes or destroys the opinion’s
precedential value. Id. at 1437. And, most jurisdictions ban or severely limit them
for citation purposes. Id.
16. El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc., 201 F. App’x 773 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Stoller, 199 F. App’x 954; Hart, 184 F. App’x 972; Miguel Torres, S.A., 176 F.
App’x 124.
17. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
18. El Encanto, Inc., 201 F. App’x at 774; Stoller, 199 F. App’x at 958; Hart, 184 F.
App’x at 973; Miguel Torres, S.A., 176 F. App’x at 126.
19. 457 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
19. Id.; see also In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
21. 7 U.S.C. § 2567 (2000).
22. 457 F.3d at 1274; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
23. 457 F.3d at 1272.
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24

known as “Coker 9663.” Coker 9663 is certified and protected by
25
the PVPA. Companies selling certified PVPA seeds including Coker
26
Syngenta also owns the
9663 must use “approved packaging.”
27
trademark “COKER.”
Delta Cotton (“Delta”) is a grain elevator
28
operator in Arkansas. Delta acts as a middleman for grain sales of
29
local farmers by testing, grading, and storing grain. In addition,
Delta purchases entire crops of wheat from local farmers, finds buyers
30
for the grain, and takes a commission on such sales. All the wheat is
stored in one large bin and Delta sells a mix of the wheat as animal
31
feed in fifty pound bags labeled “Delta Co-Op Feed.”
Allegedly, Delta sold bags labeled “feed wheat” that contained
32
Coker 9663. In 2001, Syngenta’s law firm hired a man who bought
three bags of this feed. An agronomist tested the feed for Coker 9663
33
and found that they contained ninety percent Coker 9663.
Syngenta filed suit against Delta in 2002 for infringement of the
PVPA and the Lanham Act seeking permanent injunctive relief,
34
treble damages, disgorgement of profits, and costs. A jury rendered
35
a verdict in Syngenta’s favor. The district court entered damages of
$67,500 for PVPA infringement, $67,500 for Lanham Act
36
infringement, and interest.
The court also granted permanent
injunction and costs, denying Delta’s motions for a new trial,
37
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remitter.
Delta
38
appealed.
The jury found that Delta violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) based on a
39
“reverse palming off” or “reverse passing off” theory.
Reverse
passing off occurs when a company offers a trademarked good for
sale under another designation, thus miscommunicating the good’s
40
source of origin to consumers.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1272-73.
35. Id. at 1273.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1277.
40. Id. (citing Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 n.1
(2003)).
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The court first reviewed its own standard of review for the denial of
a motion for judgment as a matter of law and stated that in Lanham
Act cases, the proper standard of review is dictated by “the relevant
41
regional circuit—here, the Eighth.” In this case, the two circuits,
Eighth and Federal, had similar precedent—reviewing this case de
novo since the district court denied the motion for judgment as a
42
matter of law after a verdict from a jury. Since the Eighth Circuit
only reviews issues raised in pre-verdict motions, the issues for the
Federal Circuit were limited to: “(1) whether the jury’s verdicts of
infringement under the PVPA and confusion or injury under the
Lanham Act were supported by evidence sufficient to sustain the
verdicts, and (2) whether the district court correctly applied section
43
2567 of the PVPA.” The second issue is not one that we will discuss
in depth in this summary as it is unrelated to trademark law.
The first issue directly relates to the issue of Lanham Act
infringement, the reverse palming off claim violated here under
§ 1125(a) of the Lanham Act. In order to recover on a reverse
palming off theory under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove four
elements: “(1) that the work at issue originated with the plaintiff; (2)
that origin of the work was falsely designated by the defendant; (3)
that the false designation origin was likely to cause consumer
confusion; and (4) that the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant’s
44
false designation of origin.”
Delta argued first that Syngenta failed to satisfy the first element of
the test because it presented no evidence that Delta knew that the
seeds it purchased from local farmers to sell as animal feed contained
45
Coker 9663. Delta attacked the second element of the test because
Syngenta’s claim included “no evidence of ‘false designation’ of the
seeds, because the feed bags in question lacked ‘any designation
(false or otherwise) regarding the origin of the seeds,’ and because
there was no evidence that ‘the bags of feed sold to Mr. Robnett were
46
intended for planting.’” Delta’s third argument was that there was
no consumer confusion or likelihood of such because there was no
evidence that Delta made any attempt to portray itself as the grain’s

41. Id. at 1273 (citing Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1274.
44. Id. at 1277 (citing Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1995)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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47

producer. Delta’s final argument was that there was no actual harm
48
to Syngenta “by the allegedly false designation.”
The court dismissed Delta’s first two arguments by holding there is
no scienter requirement for Lanham Act infringement, thus making
the placing of the words “Delta Co-op Feed” on the bags containing
49
Coker 9663 “sufficient to constitute false designation.” Turning to
the injury itself, the court noted that “the gravamen of the injury” in a
reverse passing off case is the loss of advertising value in its name and
the lack of business goodwill derived from the public having
50
knowledge of the product’s “true source.”
In support of the jury verdict on the Lanham Act claim, the trial
court stated that a reasonable jury could have concluded that the
injury was the harm caused by the false designation of the seed in
51
Delta’s bags. The trial court upheld the verdict in claiming that
Syngenta was harmed by the deprivation of advertising value in its
name and the lack of benefit in the public having no knowledge of
52
“the true source of the . . . product.”
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the trial court’s conclusions,
finding insufficient evidence to conclude that Delta’s actions had
53
somehow injured Syngenta’s reputation.
Since Syngenta’s name
appeared nowhere on the bags of seed labeled “Delta Co-op Feed,”
54
Syngenta sustained no reputational injury.
The Delta customers
were none the wiser to have bought Syngenta’s trademarked product
and had thus, as the court said, “drawn no conclusions about the
55
merits or quality of that product.” Finally, the court found that
since those were the only harms considered by the jury, the court
could not conclude that the verdict was supported by sufficient
evidence of lost advertising value, lost good will, or any other similar
56
injury.
The court also opened the door for another possible outcome in
this case or a similar one. The evidence for the purpose of the resold
seed, which was for some reason unavailable or incomplete in the
trial court record, could have been “highly relevant to Syngenta’s
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1277-78.
49. Id. at 1278.
50. Id. (citing Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 785 (2d Cir.
1994)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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57

Lanham Act claim.” The court cited two reasons for such relevancy:
(1) much of Syngenta’s alleged harm is based upon the assumption
that the seed, once resold, will be disseminated and thus deprive
Syngenta of its market share; and (2) “whether a claim for reverse
passing off is even cognizable when the rebranded product is used for
a different purpose than, and does not compete with, the
58
trademarked product.” The lack of evidence as to these reasons
forced the court’s hand in this case, mandating reversal of the trial
court’s denial of Delta’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on
59
both the PVPA and the Lanham Act claims.
2. Trademark damages
60
In Go Medical Industries Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s “broad latitude” to adjust a jury’s
61
damages award for trademark infringement.
Dr. Alexander O’Neil invented a catheter that reduced the
62
likelihood of urinary tract infections. In 1985, he obtained U.S.
63
Go
Patent No. 4,652,259 (the “‘259 patent”) for the catheter.
Medical Industries, Pty., Ltd. (“Go Med”), an Australian company
founded by O’Neil in 1982, manufactures and markets catheters
64
covered by the ‘259 patent.
In 1988, Go Med entered into an
agreement with Medical Marketing Group (“MMG”) granting it the
65
exclusive right to distribute the catheters in the United States.
Though MMG initially purchased catheters from Go Med, it later
manufactured the catheters itself and sold them as “MMG/O’Neil”
66
catheters.
MMG obtained a trademark registration for the
67
“MMG/O’Neil” trademark for catheters in 1993.
At MMG’s urging, Go Med sued C.R. Bard for patent infringement
68
in 1992. The district court granted summary judgment to C.R. Bard
and held that the ‘259 patent was unenforceable based on
69
inequitable conduct and for being invalid as anticipated. On these

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1279.
Id.
Id.
471 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1267.
Id.
Id. at 1267-68.
Id. at 1268.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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patent issues, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for further
70
proceedings.
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s reversal, MMG informed Go Med that
it no longer believed they had a contract given the district court’s
71
invalidity finding. In response, Go Med terminated the agreement
72
and demanded that MMG cease using the “O’Neil” trademark.
MMG refused and continued to sell “MMG/O’Neil” catheters even
73
after it sold its assets to Inmed International Corporation (“Rüsch”).
74
In 2003, Rüsch changed the name of its catheters to “Rüsch/MMG.”
Go Med subsequently sued MMG and Rüsch for, among other
75
things, trademark infringement. The district court denied summary
judgment on the trademark claims, finding a triable issue of fact as to
“whether ‘O’Neil’ had acquired secondary meaning, whether the
agreement between the parties included an implied trademark
license, and whether the ‘O’Neil’ mark was abandoned due to naked
76
licensing.” The district court found that factual disputes existed
even though it considered MMG and Rüsch’s admission of a
likelihood of confusion between “O’Neil” and “MMG/O’Neil” in
their trademark infringement counterclaims to be a judicial
77
admission on that issue.
At trial, the jury found in favor of Go Med on the trademark
78
infringement claims. On the claim against MMG, the jury awarded
$350,838 as a reasonable royalty, $3,873,236 for unjust enrichment,
79
As to the trademark
and $19,000,000 in punitive damages.
infringement claims against Rüsch, the jury awarded Go Med
$2,672,419 as a reasonable royalty and $32,265,634 for unjust
80
enrichment.
MMG and Rüsch both challenged the awards with
81
Rule 50(b) motions for judgment as a matter of law.
The district court granted MMG’s Rule 50(b) motion in-part and
82
Regarding damages for
granted Rüsch’s motion in its entirety.
trademark infringement, the district court characterized the jury’s
royalty award as recovery based on profits rather than actual
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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damages—and therefore subject to reduction—because it was based
83
on a speculative royalty rate. Rejecting Go Med’s argument that the
jury awarded lost profits under common law, the district court also
exercised its discretion under the Lanham Act and set aside the jury’s
84
85
award of lost profits. Go Med appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s damages
86
reduction. First, the Federal Circuit noted that 15 U.S.C. § 1117
provides for the award of profits, damages and costs, and attorneys’
87
fees in trademark infringement cases. The court stressed that any
88
such award is “subject to the principles of equity” and that § 1117
empowered the district court to reduce an award based on profits if
89
excessive. The court noted that the jury’s royalty award “was not
based on substantial evidence of actual damages” and that Go Med’s
expert had “merely considered MMG’s excess earnings and attributed
90
three percent to the trademark.” The court agreed with the district
court’s assessment that it seemed as if Go Med’s expert “arbitrarily
91
pulled [the three percent figure] out of the air.” The district court’s
determination, according to the Federal Circuit, was supported by
the evidence that the success of MMG’s catheters was more likely
attributable to its marketing, the superiority of the product and its
eligibility for the medicare reimbursement rather than the “O’Neil”
92
mark.
The Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s
decision to set aside the jury’s award of profits and punitive
93
damages.
B. Appeals from the Board
1. Trade dress
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that trade dress marks
would henceforth be divided into two categories:
product
94
The significance of this
configuration and product packaging.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1270.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1273-74.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000).
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categorization is that trade dress deemed to be product configuration
must have acquired distinctiveness to be registrable, whereas trade
95
dress deemed to be product packaging is automatically registrable.
The Supreme Court left the method for distinguishing between
product configuration and product packaging to the lower courts.
Until 2006, the Federal Circuit had not had an opportunity to offer
its guidance on this legally significant distinction.
96
In In re Slokevage, the Federal Circuit ruled that Joanne
Slokevage’s trade dress for clothing was unregistrable because it was a
97
product configuration and, as such, not inherently distinctive. The
court affirmed the Board’s decision sustaining the refusal of the
98
examining attorney to register the mark.
Slokevage filed an application to register the mark on the Principal
99
Register. The mark consisted of “a label with the words ‘FLASH
DARE!’ in a V-shaped background, and cut-out areas located on each
100
side of the label.” The configuration is set forth below:

The cut-out areas, which were intended to be located on the rear of
pants, overalls, shorts, culottes, dresses and skirts, consisted of a hole
101
in the garment and a fabric flap attached to it with a closure device.
Prior to attempting to register the trade dress, Slokevage applied for
and received protection for various aspects of the “configuration,”
including a trademark registration for the word mark “FLASH
DARE,” a trademark registration for the design mark for the cut out
design (registered on the Supplemental Register) and even a design
102
patent for the cut out design.
The trademark examining attorney refused registration of the
proposed mark because “it constituted a clothing configuration that
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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is not inherently distinctive.” And though the trademark examiner
gave Slokevage an opportunity to present evidence of acquired
distinctiveness or to disclaim the design element of the configuration,
she refused and argued that the trade dress was inherently
104
distinctive. The examiner finalized the refusal to register the mark,
finding that the clothing configuration constituted product
105
design/configuration (as opposed to product packaging).
Based
106
the examiner
on the Supreme Court’s holding in Wal-Mart,
concluded that the product design could not be inherently
107
distinctive. Additionally, the examiner noted that Slokevage could
not avoid the disclaimer requirement because her configuration was
108
Her reference to the trade dress as a “cut-away flap
not unitary.
design” in her application supported the examiner’s determination
109
that the configuration constituted product design.
110
Slokevage appealed. The Board adopted the examiner’s finding
that the cut-out areas constituted product design and accordingly,
111
pursuant to Wal-Mart,
Slokevage could not register the
112
configuration absent proof of acquired distinctiveness. The Board
then concluded that the trade dress configuration was not unitary
because previously, Slokevage registered the portions of the trade
113
dress separately.
The Board offered to set aside its decision, in
accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(g), if Slokevage “disclaimed the
114
unregisterable holes and flaps portion of the configuration.”
Slokevage declined, instead requesting reconsideration of the
115
Board’s decision.
The Board denied Slokevage’s request and she
116
appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that it applied a
“limited standard of review to Board decisions, reviewing legal
determinations de novo and factual findings for substantial
117
evidence.” In so doing, the court addressed a preliminary issue of
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000).
In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d at 959.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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first impression: is the determination of whether trade dress
constitutes product design a question of law (as Slokevage proposed)
118
or a question of fact (as the government contended)? Because the
determination involves consumer perception, the court concluded
that it is a question of fact “akin to [a determination of] whether a
trademark is inherently distinctive or whether a mark is descriptive,
119
which are questions of fact.” Accordingly, the court concluded that
it would review both the Board’s finding on product design and
whether the mark is unitary—both questions of fact—for substantial
120
evidence.
On the substantive issue of whether her trade dress constituted
product design, Slokevage attempted to distinguish (and hem in) the
Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision, which also involved clothing
121
design.
She contended that her trade dress could not be product
design because it did not alter the entire product, only a portion of it,
122
and was, therefore, more akin to a product label.
The Federal
Circuit rejected these arguments, noting that the “holes and flaps
portion are part of the design of the clothing—the cut-out area is not
merely a design placed on top of the garment, but is a design
123
incorporated into the garment itself.”
Relying on the examples
provided in Wal-Mart of trade dress that constituted product design,
the Federal Circuit determined that product design “can consist of
design features incorporated into a product” and that product design
124
does not have to implicate the entire product.
The court also found instructive the analysis in Wal-Mart for why
product configuration cannot be inherently distinctive. Applying the
Supreme Court’s reasoning from Wal-Mart, the Federal Circuit
reasoned that:
unlike a trademark whose “predominant function” remains source
identification, product design often serves other functions, such as
rendering the “product itself more useful or more appealing.” The
design at issue here can serve such utilitarian and aesthetic
functions. For example, consumers may purchase Slokevage’s
clothing for the utilitarian purpose of wearing a garment or
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
120. Id.
121. Id. Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc. involved “a line of spring/summer
one-piece seersucker [children’s] outfits decorated with appliqués of hearts, flowers,
fruits, and the like.” 529 U.S. 205, 207 (2000).
122. In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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because they find the appearance of the garment particularly
desirable. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in WalMart, in such cases when the purchase implicates a utilitarian or
aesthetic purpose, rather than a source-identifying function, it is
125
appropriate to require proof of acquired distinctiveness.

Specifically, the court noted that Slokevage’s design could serve
both aesthetic and utilitarian functions and that it was, therefore,
126
“appropriate to require proof of acquired distinctiveness.”
Moreover, the court noted that even if the case were close, Wal-Mart
mandated that courts act cautiously and categorize ambiguous trade
127
dress as product design.
Turning to the issue of whether the mark was unitary, Slokevage
argued that the elements of her design were inseparable and,
128
therefore, unitary.
Thus, the examining attorney erred by
requiring her to disclaim the unregisterable holes and flaps portion
129
The Federal Circuit determined that
of the configuration.
substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that the
130
mark is not unitary. It opined that “[t]he display of elements in the
drawing of the trade dress, the applicant’s earlier registration of the
words ‘FLASH DARE!,’ and the applicant’s design patent on the cutout area” belied Slokevage’s assertion that the trade dress was
131
unitary. The court concluded that, while it is possible to combine
the elements as to be inseparable, Slokevage’s trade dress was not
unitary as shown by the separate locations of the words and design
132
elements and the separate registration of the elements.
The
133
Federal Circuit thus affirmed the Board’s decision in all respects.
2. Genericness
134
In In re Pennington Seed, Inc., the second seed name case this year,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s refusal to register the term
135
“Rebel” as a trademark for grass seed.
The court held that the
Board properly concluded that the applied-for mark was a generic
136
designation and, accordingly, was not entitled to registration.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 962-63.
Id. at 963.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Federal Circuit has since denied re-hearing en banc.
Id.
466 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1054-55.
Id. at 1055.
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KRB Seed Company, LLC (“KRB”) applied to register the word
137
Prior to filing its
“Rebel” as a trademark for grass seed in 2001.
application, KRB designated “Rebel” as the varietal name for the
grass seed that was protected by a plant variety protection certificate
138
(the “variety certificate”).
The trademark examining attorney
refused registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052 and 1127
based on the long-held principle that a varietal name is deemed a
139
generic term and thus incapable of the requisite distinctiveness.
KRB appealed to the Board which, at the trademark examining
attorney’s request, remanded to address KRB’s claim of acquired
140
distinctiveness pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
The trademark
examining attorney refused registration under § 1052(f), and
finalized his refusal to register “Rebel” as a trademark for grass
141
seed.
KRB appealed to the Board that affirmed the examining
142
attorney’s decision.
The Board agreed that the evidence established that “Rebel” is a
143
varietal name for a type of grass seed. Additionally, relying on Dixie
144
the Board re-affirmed the long-standing
Rose Nursery v. Coe,
principle treating varietal names as generic and, therefore, not
145
subject to trademark protection.
The Board cited additional
support for its decision in the Trademark Manual of Examining
Procedure (the “Trademark Manual”), which instructs examining
attorneys to refuse registration of varietal names, and the
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (“Convention”), which provides that a name for a new plant
variety must be designated and that the designation is its generic
146
name. Finally, the Board rejected KRB’s reliance on TrafFix Devices,
147
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. to argue that a claimed feature of an
expired patent could still function as a trademark because KRB had
148
KRB’s application for a plant
to give a name for a plant variety.
variety certificate was a clear indication that the varietal name is

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
131 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
466 F.3d at 1055.
Id.
532 U.S. 23 (2001).
466 F.3d at 1055.
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149

generic.
KRB appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal
150
Circuit.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that whether a
term is a generic name for a good is a question of fact, which the
151
court reviews for substantial evidence. On appeal, KRB first argued
152
that the Board misconstrued Dixie Rose Nursery v. Coe to stand for
the proposition that a blanket refusal to register a varietal name is
153
appropriate because such varietal names are generic. As an initial
matter, the Federal Circuit determined that substantial evidence
supported the examining attorney’s determination, affirmed by the
154
Board, that “Rebel” was a varietal name and, therefore, generic. In
support of this determination, the court cited information from the
Germplasm Resources Information Network website, information
from the Convention database, and information from the
Department of Agriculture—all of which listed “Rebel” as the varietal
155
name for a particular type of grass seed.
Next, the court determined that the Board correctly decided that
the varietal name “Rebel” is generic and thus not entitled to
156
trademark protection.
The court found the D.C. Circuit’s
157
158
Dixie Rose involved a varietal
reasoning in Dixie Rose instructive.
159
name for a rose. The D.C. Circuit concluded that since the varietal
name was “known throughout the trade, and listed in applicant’s
160
catalog by that name,” the words had evolved from being originally
arbitrary to describing a plant of a particular sort—not from a
161
particular nursery or distributor. The Federal Circuit adopted this
interpretation and determined that varietal names indicate a
particular variety of plant, rather than the source of the plant, and, as
162
such, are generic and cannot be trademarked. The court went on
to reassert the well-established principle “that an applicant cannot
163
acquire trademark protection for the generic name of a product.”
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1056.
151. Id.
152. 131 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
153. 466 F.3d at 1056.
154. Id. at 1058.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1056-57.
157. 131 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
158. 466 F.3d at 1057.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Dixie Rose, 131 F.2d at 446).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S.
598, 602 (1888)).
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KRB also argued that a per se rule against issuing trademark
164
protection for varietal names is against public policy. The Federal
Circuit disagreed, maintaining that the ban on registering varietal
names is sound public policy because “those in trade ‘need to call it
by the name that it is known or otherwise consumers will not know
165
what they are buying.’”
KRB further argued that the Convention does not apply because
KRB’s variety certificate was issued before the Convention’s effective
166
date. However, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding
that while the Convention was not controlling, the policy of refusing
registration of varietal names was consistent with the Convention’s
requirements and supported the examining attorney’s refusal to
167
register “Rebel” as a trademark.
Next, KRB argued that the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), and
168
the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Montrochet provide support for
the proposition that a mark cannot be generic solely because it has
169
also been used as a name for a product.
The Federal Circuit first
dispensed with KRB’s argument regarding the Lanham Act by noting
that section 1064(3) only pertains to cancellation of registered marks
and is inapplicable to an instance where the mark was not
170
registered.
Similarly, the court deemed its decision in In re
Montrochet unavailing because the mark in that instance had already
171
been registered and had become generic.
Finally, KRB argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix
172
173
Devices prohibited a per se rule against trademark protection.
However, the Federal Circuit found TrafFix inapplicable, noting that
the case concerned “whether a claimed feature of an expired patent
174
could acquire trade dress protection.”
Accordingly, the court
concluded that the TrafFix decision “did not provide a relevant
175
analogy to this case” and was unavailing to KRB.

164. Id. at 1056.
165. Id. at 1059 (quoting In re KRB Seed, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156, 1160
(2005)).
166. Id. at 1056.
167. Id. at 1059.
168. 878 F.2d 375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
169. 466 F.3d at 1059-60.
170. Id. at 1060.
171. Id.
172. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
173. 466 F.3d at 1060.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that plant varietal names, like
“Rebel,” are generic and substantial evidence supported the Board’s
176
decision.
3. Likelihood of confusion
Of the five cases analyzing the likelihood of confusion factors, only
177
one decision, M2 Software, Inc. v. MS Communications, Inc., was
designated as precedential. In M2 Software,, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Board’s finding that two companies marketing software
with similar marks in different industries likely would not cause
178
confusion.
M2 Software had appealed the Board’s decision
dismissing M2 Software’s opposition to M2 Communication’s
registration of the mark “M2 COMMUNICATIONS” for interactive
multimedia CD-ROMs containing information related to various
179
healthcare fields, including pharmaceutical and medical industries.
The Board found that though the two marks were “very similar,” they
were not identical because of the use in conjunction with
180
“Communications” and “Software.”
The Board found that the
181
parties have different markets since M2 Software is involved in the
music and entertainment industries exclusively, and M2
Communications is involved in the medical, pharmaceutical, and
182
biotechnology industries exclusively. The Board found further that
even though both companies used CD-ROMs to communicate with
their markets, they were still separate and distinct markets and
“notwithstanding similarities in media platform, are different
183
goods.” The Board found that any such overlap of consumers is de
184
minimus at most.
In addition to the two companies operating in wholly unrelated
industries, the Board considered the lack of overlap in consumers
and the absence of other factors suggesting a likelihood of
185
confusion.
Thus, the Board concluded that there is no likelihood
186
of confusion and dismissed M2 Software’s opposition.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1380-81.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
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The court went through the likelihood of confusion analysis by
187
The court reviewed the Board’s
analyzing the DuPont factors.
findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard and any legal
188
conclusions of the Board de novo. Bearing this in mind, the court,
under its own precedent, considered only relevant factors and the
189
record.
The court first examined findings of the Board and, specifically,
the weight the Board afforded to the unrelated nature of the goods
in question and the different channels of both trade and
190
purchasers.
The court found there was substantial evidence to
support the finding that the goods were not related by considering, as
191
per prior precedent in Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, the
applicant’s goods as set forth in their applications for registration of
192
the marks.
The court looked at M2 Software’s argument that the
Board “erred in declining to read the scope of its registration more
193
broadly.” But the court disagreed: “Such a reading would require
us to improperly ignore scope limiting language within the clause it
cites, i.e., language plainly limiting its registration to goods in the
194
music and entertainment fields.”
M2 Software’s contention that the goods were similar failed to
195
M2 Software argued that since both
persuade the court as well.
companies use CD-ROMS they are similar and likely to confuse
196
consumers. The court easily disposed of this argument by pointing
to the fact that the application and registration of the mark make
clear that the relevant goods are not CD-ROMs generally, but CD197
ROMs produced for a particular field. Thus, M2 Software’s line of
198
reasoning failed. Next, the court moved its analysis to the channels
199
of trade and purchasers of the products. The court agreed with the
Board’s findings, supported by substantial evidence, that the parties’

187. Id. at 1381-85; 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
188. 450 F.3d at 1382.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 293 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours &
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
192. 450 F.3d at 1382.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1383.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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channels of trade and purchase are different with at most a de
200
minimus overlap.
Subsequently, even considering evidence contrary to the Board’s
final finding but included in its assessment, the court concluded that
the “M2” portion of the marks were both identical and the disclaimed
terms failed to “create any significant difference in meaning or
201
commercial impression.”
Thus, the court agreed that the Board
202
The court
properly weighed this factor in M2 Software’s favor.
concluded that the Board did not err in finding that the marks were
203
not identical when considered as a whole.
204
Lastly, the court considered the fanciful nature of the “M2” mark.
While the court agreed that the mark is fanciful, that factor was
outweighed by the previous factors in M2 Communication’s favor
listed above and did not affect the Board’s finding that no likelihood
205
of confusion exists.
C. Appeals from the International Trade Commission
206

In Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the
Federal Circuit reaffirmed that the determination of material
differences, which supports the Lanham Act’s section 1337 ban on
207
the importation of “gray market” goods, is a low threshold.
Gray
market goods are “products that [are] ‘produced by the owner of the
U.S. trademark or with its consent, but not authorized for sale in the
208
United States.’”
Deere sells two models of harvesters in North America and Europe:
209
the 5000 series and the 6000 series. Each series further divides into
210
those sold in North America and those sold in Europe. While being
sold under the same model numbers, the North American and
European versions are manufactured with certain differences,
211
including differences in labeling and safety features.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1384.
202. Id.
203. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case. 127 S. Ct. 836, 166
L.Ed.2d 666 (2006), reh’g denied, 127 S. Ct. 1363, No. 06-515, 2007, WL 506879
(Feb. 20, 2007)
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 444 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
207. Id. at 1321.
208. 444 F.3d at 1320 (quoting Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
200 F.3d 775, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
209. Id. at 1321.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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Appellants, a group of corporations, were involved in the
importing and selling of the European version Deere harvesters in
212
They appealed the decision of the International
North America.
Trade Commission (“ITC”) that affirmed the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge that since the European version of the
Deere harvesters were materially different from the North American
versions, appellants violated section 1337 of the Lanham Act by
213
importing and selling the models in North America.
The court explained the rationale behind preventing gray market
goods from coming into the U.S. market by quoting its previous
opinion in Gamut: “To the extent that foreign goods bearing a
trademark have different characteristics than those trademarked
goods authorized for sale in the United States, the public is likely to
become confused or deceived as to which characteristics are properly
associated with the trademark, thereby possibly eroding the goodwill
214
of the trademark holder in the United States.”
The basic question in this and other gray market cases, therefore, is
whether the foreign and domestic products are different, and if so,
215
whether those differences are material.
The statute does not
distinguish between foreign and domestically manufactured goods,
nor does gray market law concern itself with whether the trademark
owner controlled the manufacture of the product or whether use of
216
the trademark in another country was authorized.
Rather, the
statute makes unlawful “[t]he importation into the United States, the
sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after
importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that
infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered
217
under the Trademark Act of 1946.”
Thus, gray market law is
concerned with whether or not “the trademark owner has control
over the specific characteristics associated with the trademark in the
218
United States.”
On the question of material difference, the Federal Circuit
219
The court noted that the threshold for such a
affirmed the ITC.
220
determination is quite low.
There must only be a showing that
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1320.
214. Id. at 1320 (quoting Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 200
F.3d 775, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
215. Id. at 1321.
216. Id. at 1322.
217. Id. at 1323 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(c)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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consumers would find significant differences between the products
authorized for sale in the United States and the unauthorized
221
Thus, the court agreed with the Administrative Law
products.
Judge’s determination that the differences between the harvesters
were significant and held that the judge’s finding was supported by
222
substantial evidence.
Evidence of sales of European models sold at authorized dealers in
223
the United States complicated this case.
The court held that the
unauthorized importation and sale in the United States of the Deere
harvesters produced solely for sale abroad violates section 1337 only if
the imported good is “materially different from all or substantially
all” of the goods bearing the same mark that are authorized for sale
224
in the United States.
Thus, Deere bore the additional burden of
proving that all or substantially all of the Deere harvester sales in
North America were of the North American version and not the
225
European version.
The court found that Deere did not meet its
226
burden. The court imputed knowledge of these sales of European
models at authorized dealers to Deere and remanded the case for
227
further argument on this issue.
The court noted that on remand,
Deere could meet its burden by showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the sales of the European harvesters in the United
States were so minute that substantially all of Deere’s sales in the
228
United States were of the North American version harvester.
II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board
1. Res judicata
229
In Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha v. Thinksharp, Inc., the Federal Circuit
had the opportunity to address a procedural issue—the application of
the doctrine of res judicata. In Sharp, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Board’s decision that an applicant’s choice to contest only the
opposition to its word mark was not barred, via the doctrine of res
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326-27.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
448 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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judicata, by a default judgment entered against it in opposition to its
230
The Federal
related application for a word-and-design mark.
Circuit held that the applicant, ThinkSharp, Inc. (“ThinkSharp”)
“was not required to litigate both oppositions in order to preserve the
231
right to litigate one.”
ThinkSharp first filed an application to register the word mark
THINKSHARP and later filed an application for the mark
232
THINKSHARP-and-design. Both marks were intended for use with
educational goods and services, specifically, in the areas of problem
233
solving and critical thinking.
After publication, Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha (“Sharp”) filed an opposition to the word mark application for
234
Subsequently, Sharp filed an opposition to
THINKSHARP.
235
ThinkSharp’s word-and-design registration.
In both of its
oppositions, Sharp asserted that THINKSHARP was confusingly
similar to and dilutive of its family of trademarks incorporating the
236
word SHARP.
ThinkSharp contested only Sharp’s opposition to the application
237
for the word mark THINKSHARP. It did not answer the word-and238
design mark opposition. Accordingly, the Board entered a default
judgment for Sharp, sustaining the opposition to the word-and-design
239
Subsequently, after the Board proceedings were completed
mark.
in the word mark case, but in advance of the Board’s ruling, Sharp
asserted that the doctrine of res judicata operated to preclude
ThinkSharp from contesting the word mark opposition based on its
240
default judgment in the word-and-design mark matter.
241
The Board disagreed. It held that “the applicant was entitled to
choose to pursue one registration and abandon the other, even after
oppositions had been filed” and that an applicant is “not required to
defend against multiple oppositions in order to preserve its right to
242
defend against one of them.” In so holding, the Board concluded
230. Id. at 1372.
231. Id. at 1372-73.
232. The first application was filed on February 26, 1999 and the second
application was filed on June 4, 1999. Id. at 1369.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1370.
242. Id. The Board initially rejected Sharp’s argument on the basis that it had
failed to provide ThinkSharp with notice of its intent to rely on the default judgment
and that it did not raise this issue until the close of the evidentiary period. Id. On
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that the default judgment entered against ThinkSharp on the wordand-design mark did not preclude it from defending its application to
243
register the word mark. On the substantive issue of confusion, the
Board found that there was no likelihood of confusion between
244
SHARP and THINKSHARP.
Sharp appealed only the Board’s res judicata determination to the
245
Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit began its analysis of the issue
by noting that the determination of whether a claim is barred by res
246
judicata is a matter of law subject to plenary review. For res judicata
to apply, the court stated that the merits of Sharp’s opposition to
ThinkSharp’s word-and-design mark must have been “litigated and
247
decided.”
On this issue, Sharp argued that the legal effect of the
default judgment was that the Board ruled in its favor on the merits
of its pleadings in the word-and-design mark opposition, and “that
Sharp’s uncontested allegations therein must now be taken as
248
undisputed fact.” ThinkSharp asserted in response that “the marks
[were] not the same, that the merits were not decided, that
allegations in pleadings are not proven facts, that precedent is
contrary to Sharp’s position, and that the Board correctly applied the
249
rules and procedures of trademark practice.”
The Board, and ultimately the Federal Circuit, distinguished the
precedent cited by Sharp. Unlike the plaintiffs in Miller Brewing Co. v.
250
Coy International Corp., ThinkSharp did not adopt a second mark
251
and file separate applications specifically to evade a prior judgment.
Further, the Federal Circuit found it highly relevant that the wordand-design mark judgment was entered solely on default, not on the
252
merits of Sharp’s allegations.
After noting that “precedent weighs
heavily against denying litigants a day in court unless there is a clear
and persuasive basis for that denial,” the court stressed that the two
marks were different, there had been no consideration of the merits,
and “res judicata would deny ThinkSharp its day in court without a
reconsideration, and after Sharp brought to the Board’s attention a notice letter to
ThinkSharp that was a part of the record, the Board nonetheless upheld its
determination that res judicata did not determine the issue raised in Sharp’s
opposition to the word mark application. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1371.
249. Id.
250. 230 U.S.P.Q. 675, 678 (TTAB 1986).
251. 448 F.3d at 1371.
252. Id.
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253

‘clear and persuasive basis for that denial.’”
Finally, the Federal
Circuit noted that although “the purpose of res judicata is salutary, for
it prevents [litigants] from being required to relitigate the same issue
against the same party in a separate action,” this purpose was not
254
served in the instant case. The court reasoned that where, as here,
a trademark owner is not seeking to evade a prior adverse judgment
on the merits, precedent and sound administrative policy support
“the Board’s reasoning that a trademark owner is entitled to choose
255
which opposition to defend.” The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the
256
Board’s decision.
III. UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
As mentioned above, four of the five decisions in which the Federal
Circuit analyzed the likelihood of confusion factors were unpublished
and were designated by the Court as non-precedential pursuant to
Federal Circuit Rule 47.6. Local Rule 47.6(b) provided that “[a]n
opinion or order which is designated as not to be cited as precedent
is one unanimously determined by the panel issuing it as not adding
significantly to the body of law. Any opinion or order so designated
must not be employed or cited as precedent.” The Federal Circuit
has strictly enforced this rule in the past, at one point even issuing a
257
stern warning that it would sanction counsel for violating this rule.
In so doing, the Court reasoned: “Violations of . . . Rule 47.6 which
prohibits the citation of nonprecedential opinions . . . are all too
frequent. In addition to imposing an unfair burden on opposing
parties, violations of our rules also burden the court. The court must
consider a large number of appeals each year. It can only conduct its
work fairly and efficiently if counsel cooperate by abiding by the
pertinent rules.”
Effective December 1, 2006, however, this rule was superseded by
Local Rule 32.1. This rule, which reflects what is now embodied in
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, prohibits the court from
restricting the citation of opinions or orders that it has designated as
“unpublished” or “non-precedential.”
Thus, Local Rule 32.1
provides, in relevant part:

253. Id. at 1372 (quoting Kearns v. Gen. Motors Corp., 94 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
254. Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. In re violation of Rule 28(c), 388 F.3d 1383 (Misc. No. 774) (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5,
2004).
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(b) Nonprecedential Opinion or Order. An opinion or order which is
designated as non-precedential is one determined by the panel
issuing it as not adding significantly to the body of law.
(c) Parties’ Citation of Nonprecedential Dispositions. Parties are not
prohibited or restricted from citing nonprecedential dispositions
issued after January 1, 2007. This rule does not preclude assertion
of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the
case, and the like based on a nonprecedential disposition issued
before that date.
258

This language reflects that in FRAP 32.1.
Though the Federal
Circuit local rules now permit the citing of unpublished,
nonprecedential opinions, it will not give its own non-precedential
259
opinions the effect of binding precedent.
Nor will the court
consider binding the nonprecedential opinions of other courts,
260
unless the rules of that court so require.
Local Rule 32.1(e) now
allows, within sixty days after any nonprecedential opinion or order is
issued, any person to request, with accompanying reasons, that the
opinion or order to be reissued as precedential. If the request is
granted, the court will revise the opinion or order to reflect its
precedential status.
Although four of the five likelihood of confusion decisions issued
by the Federal Circuit in 2006 were designated as non-precedential, it
appears that, in 2007, fewer decisions will be so designated or, if they
are, such designations may be timely challenged and, even if
maintained, the decisions may nevertheless be cited.

255. FRAP 32.1 provides as follows:
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions
that have been:
(i) designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” “non-precedential,”
“not precedent,” or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
(b) Copies Required. If a party cites a federal judicial opinion, order,
judgment, or other written disposition that is not available in a publicly
accessible electronic database, the party must file and serve a copy of that
opinion, order, judgment, or disposition with the brief or other paper in
which it is cited.
256. Local Rule 32.1(d) provides:
“Court’s Consideration of Nonprecedential
Dispositions. The court may refer to a nonprecedential disposition in an opinion or
order and may look to a nonprecedential disposition for guidance or persuasive
reasoning, but will not give one of its own nonprecedential dispositions the effect of
binding precedent. The Court will not consider nonprecedential dispositions of
another court as binding precedent of that court unless the rules of that court so
provide.”
257. Id.

TRADEMARK.OFFTOPRINTER

1012

4/7/2007 11:20:35 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:4

A. Likelihood of Confusion
1. Hart v. New York Yankees Partnership
261
In Hart v. New York Yankees Partnership, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Board’s decision to sustain the New York Yankees
Partnership’s and Staten Island Minor League Holdings, L.L.C.’s
(collectively “Yankees”) opposition to Leon Hart’s application to
register the mark BABY BOMBERS for children’s clothing and
athletic wear based on priority of the use of the mark and likelihood
262
of confusion.
Hart filed an intent-to-use application with the Trademark Office
to register the mark BABY BOMBERS for clothing and athletic
263
wear. The Yankees opposed Hart’s mark “on the basis of their use
264
Citing Hoover Co. v.
of the common law mark BABY BOMBERS.”
265
Royal Appliance Mfg. Co., the court noted that in order to establish
their ground of opposition under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act the
Yankees had to show that they had “priority of use in the mark and
that Hart’s mark, when used on the goods set forth in the
application, would create a likelihood of confusion with the Yankees’
266
mark.”
The court further noted that because the Yankees’ mark
was unregistered, the Yankees had an additional burden of showing
267
that their mark was distinctive in order to establish priority.
Initially, the Federal Circuit noted that it would review the Board’s
factual findings concerning priority and distinctiveness for substantial
268
evidence.
After reviewing the record, the court determined that
the Yankees’ mark was distinctive “rather than merely descriptive of
the qualities or characteristics of goods or services” and noted that
269
“Hart has alleged no specific error in the Board’s analysis.”
Additionally, the court concluded that Hart’s priority date was July
23, 2001, the date he filed the intent-to-use application, and further
endorsed the Board’s finding that the Yankees had used the term
BABY BOMBERS in promotional materials to refer to their minor
league affiliate since its inception in 1999, several years prior to

261. 184 F. App’x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
262. Id. at 974.
263. Id. at 973.
264. Id.
265. 238 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
266. Hart, 184 F. App’x at 973.
267. Id. (citing Towers v. Advent Software, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 945 (Fed. Cir.
1990)).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 974.
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270

Hart’s priority date.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the “Board’s finding that the Yankees have priority in the BABY
271
BOMBERS mark is supported by substantial evidence.”
The Federal Circuit then addressed the likelihood of confusion
issue, noting that it is a question of law that the court reviews without
272
deference. The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board properly
weighed the DuPont factors in determining the existence of
“likelihood of confusion,” specifically, the similarity of the marks and
273
whether Hart’s goods and the Yankees’ services were related. The
court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that, when used in association
with entertainment services involving baseball games, the mark BABY
BOMBERS for clothing and athletic wear would be confusingly
274
similar to the Yankees’ mark.
The Board concluded, and the
Federal Circuit ultimately agreed, that the marks were identical in
appearance and sound and that the meaning and commercial
impression of BABY BOMBERS would be identical in that it would
275
suggest an association with the Yankees. Regarding the similarity of
the goods and services, the court stated that “Hart’s athletic clothing
goods were sufficiently related to the Yankees’ baseball exhibition
services that consumers would likely believe Hart’s products were
276
approved or licensed by the Yankees.”
The Federal Circuit,
277
therefore, affirmed the Board’s decision in all respects.
2. Miguel Torres, S.A. v. Bodegas Muga, S.A.
278
In Miguel Torres, S.A. v. Bodegas Muga, S.A., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Board’s dismissal of Miguel Torres, S.A.’s (“Torres”)
opposition to Bodegas Muga, S.A.’s (“Muga”) application to register
the word-and-design mark TORRE MUGA on the Principle
279
Register.
The court held that the Board had properly considered
280
the relevant factors from In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. and that
“[t]he factors favoring Muga are sufficient, when balanced against
the factors favoring Torres, to support the conclusion that Muga’s

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 973.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 973.
Id. at 973-74.
Id. at 974.
Id.
Id.
Id.
176 F. App’x 124 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Id. at 125-26.
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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mark is unlikely to cause confusion as to the source of the goods to
281
which it is affixed.”
Muga, a Spanish winery, has sold wine in the United States under
282
the TORRE MUGA mark since 1997.
Muga registered its house
283
mark MUGA for wines in 1995 and sells wine under this mark.
Torres is also a Spanish winery and has been selling wine in the
284
United States under the TORRES mark since 1964.
Torres
registered the word mark TORRES in 1970 and the word-and-design
mark TORRES in 1986, both for brandy and wine, and it also owned
285
the word marks MIGUEL TORRES and LAS TORRES for wines. On
March 27, 1998, Muga filed an intent-to-use application to register
286
the word-and-design mark TORRE MUGA for wines. On December
8, 1998, Torres filed an opposition, alleging that the similarity
between the mark Muga sought to register and its own marks would
287
“create a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of Muga’s goods.”
In addressing the likelihood of confusion question, the Board only
applied the first eight DuPont factors, reasoning that the other five
288
were not relevant in this case.
The Board concluded that the
289
second, third, and fourth factors
favored sustaining Torres’
opposition, and specifically found that the goods of both parties were
identical (both parties having described their goods as “wine” in their
registration applications), “the trade channels were similar, and the
290
purchasers . . . were relatively unsophisticated.”
However, the
Board also found that the first, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth
291
292
DuPont factors favored dismissing Torres’ opposition.
After
balancing the factors, the Board dismissed Torres’ opposition,

281. 176 F. App’x at 129.
282. Id. at 125.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 125-26.
287. Id. at 126.
288. Id.
289. The second, third, and fourth DuPont factors are, respectively, the similarity
of the goods, the similarity of established, likely-to-be-used trade channels, and the
conditions of sale and sophistication of the buyers. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours &
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
290. Miguel Torres, S.A., 176 F. App’x at 126. Neither party disputed these factual
findings on appeal. Id.
291. The first, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth factors are, respectively, the
similarity of the marks, the fame of the prior mark, third-party use of similar marks
on similar goods, any actual confusion, and the extent of concurrent use without
evidence of actual confusion. In re DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
292. Miguel Torres, S.A., 176 F. App’x at 126.
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concluding that there was no likelihood of confusion.
Torres
294
appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit began by noting that it would review the
Board’s findings regarding each DuPont factor for substantial
evidence, and would review the overall holding regarding likelihood
295
of confusion de novo. Turning to the first DuPont factor—similarity
of the marks—Torres argued that the Board improperly considered
the differences between the marks, specifically between the words
“Torres” and “Torre,” and “should have understood that prospective
purchasers will likely remember only the ‘focal point’ of the marks”—
296
the “Torre” or “tower” element.
The Board, on the other hand,
had found, and the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed, that
“prospective purchasers would be likely to understand Torres’ marks
as referring to either the surname ‘Torres’ or the plural of towers,
while they would understand Muga’s mark as referring to either the
297
surname ‘Muga’ or ‘Muga tower.’” The court noted that Torres did
not satisfy its burden of proof, as the opposer, because it “provide[d]
no evidence concerning which aspects of the marks consumers
298
[we]re most likely to remember.” The court also noted that used in
the singular, the word “torre” “does not connote the surname Torres
299
The court
or the Torres winery, but simply the word ‘tower.’”
concluded that this distinction, coupled with the fact that Muga only
used the word “torre” together with “Muga,” was sufficient to support
the Board’s finding under the first DuPont factor that the marks were
300
dissimilar.
The court next considered the fifth DuPont factor—the fame of the
301
Torres challenged the finding by the Board that
prior mark.
despite “awards . . . from wine industry publications and newspaper
articles praising the Torres winery,” Torres’ mark was not
302
“unquestionably famous.”
The Federal Circuit endorsed the
Board’s conclusion regarding Torres’ evidence of fame, noting that
the types of awards upon which Torres relied were common in the
industry and that Torres’ news recognition and awards were probative
of consumer awareness but “fell far short of the showing usually
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
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required to prove that a mark has acquired fame and the broad
303
protection that accompanies it.”
Next, the court considered Torres’ challenge to the Board’s
finding that the sixth DuPont factor—the use of similar marks on
304
similar goods by third parties—favored Muga.
The Board had
noted that in addition to Spanish, “torre” means “tower” in Italian
and Portuguese, before turning to Muga’s extensive evidence that
305
several wines in commercial use included the word “torre.” Torres
argued that this evidence was not probative in that Muga did not
provide context (such as size of the customer base) for its examples
of third party use and that mere existence of the registrations did not
306
provide evidence of consumers’ awareness of the marks.
The
Federal Circuit concluded that despite the lack of context, “the sheer
number and geographical distribution of Muga’s examples” gave the
307
evidence probative value.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit agreed
308
with the Board that the sixth DuPont factor favored Muga.
The court then considered the seventh and eighth DuPont
factors—“‘the nature and extent of any actual confusion,’ and ‘[t]he
length of time during and conditions under which there has been
309
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.’”
The court
noted that Torres had not disputed that it produced no evidence of
actual confusion, but rather simply offered “plausible explanations”
310
for this lack of evidence.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the
Board had “reasonably inferred that the lack of such evidence, under
311
the circumstances, favored Muga.”
Having upheld the Board’s findings regarding the DuPont factors,
the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s conclusion that Muga’s

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. The evidence submitted by Muga consisted of:
(1) menus from several restaurants in the United States listing such wines;
(2) evidence showing that various retail locations in the United States and
several online stores offered such wines; (3) an acknowledgment by one of
Torres’ witnesses that he was aware of some of the other wines containing
the word “torre”; (4) the Wine Spectator’s Ultimate Guide to Buying Wines, listing
several such wines; and (5) four trademark registrations . . . for marks
incorporating the word “torre” for wines.
Id. at 128-29.
306. Id. at 129.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. (quoting In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(C.C.P.A. 1973)).
310. Id.
311. Id.
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proposed mark was unlikely to cause confusion and affirmed the
312
decision of the Board.
3. El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc.
313
In El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Board’s dismissal of El Encanto Inc. d/b/a Bueno
Foods’ (“Bueno Foods”) opposition to registration of the mark SOY
314
BUENO by La Tortilla Factory, Inc. (“La Tortilla”).
This decision
turned on an evidentiary issue and serves as a warning to trademark
practitioners to heed the evidentiary rules set forth in 37 C.F.R. §
315
2.122(d) relating to inter parties proceedings before the Board.
At issue was an intent-to-use application La Tortilla had filed with
316
the USPTO to register the mark SOY BUENO for tortillas. Bueno
Foods opposed the registration, asserting “that La Tortilla’s proposed
mark was confusingly similar to several of its marks for tortillas and
317
other goods.”
Among Bueno Foods’ marks alleged to be
confusingly similar were Reg. No. 1,538,311 for the word-and-design
mark BUENO (shown below):

and Reg. No 2,374,448 for the word mark BUENO (collectively, “311
318
and 448 marks”).
In support of its likelihood of confusion
argument, Bueno Foods included copies of its pleaded registrations
319
to the notice of opposition with respect to 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d).
La Tortilla objected to the admission of the photocopies, arguing
that they were inadmissible “because they did not show the current
320
status of, and Bueno Foods’ title to, the registrations.”
Agreeing
with La Tortilla, the Board did not admit the photocopies into the
312. Id.
313. 201 F. App’x 773 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
314. Id. at 773-74.
315. Id. at 774.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d) (2006) provides, in relevant part: “(1) A registration
of the opposer or petitioner pleaded in an opposition or petition to cancel will be
received in evidence and made part of the record if the opposition or petition is
accompanied by two copies (originals or photocopies) of the registration prepared
and issued by the Patent and Trademark Office showing both the current status of
and current title to the registration.”
320. El Encanto, 201 F. App’x at 774.
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321

record. Bueno Foods was unable to prove likelihood of confusion
between La Tortilla’s SOY BUENO mark and its own 311 and 448
marks absent this evidence, and consequently, the Board dismissed
322
323
the opposition. Bueno Foods’ appealed.
The Federal Circuit began by noting that the applicable standard
324
of review for evidentiary rulings is the abuse of discretion standard.
Turning to the evidentiary issue, the court noted that 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.122(d) requires a party seeking to rely on its ownership of a
federal registration in an opposition proceeding to “make the
325
registration of record.” The party may do so by:
(1) furnishing two copies of each registration prepared and issued
by the USPTO showing both the current status of and current title
to the registration; (2) appropriate identification and introduction
of the registration during the taking of testimony; or (3) filing a
notice of reliance on the registration during Opposer’s testimony
326
period.

This is “sufficient to show that the registration is still subsisting, and
327
Indeed, as the
that [the party] currently owns the registration.”
court noted, it generally does not consider registrations that the
parties do not offer into evidence in accordance with 37 C.F.R.
328
§ 2.122(d).
Bueno Foods conceded that it had not complied with the
329
requirements of § 2.122(d). Nevertheless, it argued that the Board
should have still considered the registrations to be part of the record
“because La Tortilla had ‘fair notice’ that both the 311 and 448 marks
330
were current and owned by Bueno Foods.”
Relying on Tiffany &
331
Co. v. Columbia Industries, Inc. for the proposition “that registrations
may be entered into evidence by means other than those enumerated
in 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d),” Bueno Foods argued that La Tortilla
demonstrated its knowledge of Bueno Foods’ registrations by, among
other things, “accepting Bueno Foods’ responses during discovery
regarding the status and title in the 311 and 448 marks and

321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 773.
324. Id. at 774.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 774-75 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2122(d)).
327. Id. at 774.
328. Id. at 775 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.123(l) (2006), which provides that “[e]vidence
not obtained and filed in compliance with these sections will not be considered”).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. 455 F.2d 582 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
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submitting those responses to the Board for the record.”
The
Federal Circuit disagreed with Bueno Foods and distinguished Tiffany
& Co. on the grounds that “La Tortilla did not admit Bueno Foods’
333
title to, or current status of, the pleaded registrations.” Rather, La
Tortilla had asserted in its answer to the opposition “that it was
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of Bueno Foods’ allegations that it currently offers and sells
334
goods and services under the 311 and 448 marks.”
335
Quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp., the Federal Circuit
explained that La Tortilla’s responses in its answer were valid denials
that put Bueno Foods “on notice that its claim was being challenged,
336
thereby requiring [Bueno Foods] to prove its case.”
Despite this
notice, Bueno Foods still failed to take any steps to make its
registrations of record even though “it is incumbent upon the
opposer to submit evidence in the requisite form to demonstrate its
337
proprietary rights in, and the current status of, its pleaded marks.”
The court noted that the regulations provide “a simple,
338
straightforward, and inexpensive” way of submitting such evidence.
Accordingly, because the Board was justified in enforcing its
procedural rules, the Federal Circuit held that the Board did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Bueno Foods’ opposition, and it
339
therefore affirmed the Board’s decision.
Stoller v. Sutech U.S.A., Inc.
340
In Stoller v. Sutech U.S.A., Inc., one of the rare cases in 2006 in
which the Federal Circuit reversed (albeit in part) a determination by
the Board, the court addressed several issues involving proof of
ownership of federally registered marks, descriptiveness, and
341
likelihood of confusion.
Leo Stoller filed an opposition to an
application by Sutech U.S.A., Inc. (“Sutech”) to register the mark
342
The Board
STEALTH for “machinery, namely, lawn mowers.”
343
dismissed his opposition.
Stoller appealed to the Federal Circuit
4.

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

El Encanto, 201 F. App’x at 775.
Id.
Id.
931 F.2d 1551, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
El Encanto, 201 F. App’x at 775.
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id.
199 F. App’x 954 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Id. at 956-59.
Id. at 956.
Id.
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arguing that Sutech was not entitled to register the STEALTH
344
mark.
Stoller, proceeding pro se, raised a wide array of arguments in an
attempt to reverse the Board’s findings. First, Stoller argued that
Sutech’s trademark application was void because Sutech’s parent
corporation, and not Sutech itself, was the owner of the STEALTH
345
mark. Hence, Stoller contended, the application was void because
346
it identified the wrong party as the applicant. The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument, noting that “between a parent and its
subsidiary, ownership of a mark is ‘largely a matter to be decided
347
between the parties themselves.’”
In addition, the Federal Circuit
endorsed the Board’s finding that Sutech was the proper party to
register the mark because it maintained the necessary “control of the
348
nature and quality of the goods identified by the mark.”
Next, Stoller argued that the Board should deny Sutech’s
application because the mark was merely descriptive of Sutech’s
349
lawnmowers. The Federal Circuit found this argument unavailing,
noting that Stoller did not suggest that Sutech intended to evoke the
350
dictionary meaning of the word “stealth.” Rather, Stoller had relied
on testimony of Sutech’s vice president that Sutech’s lawnmowers
351
The Federal Circuit found
resembled a Stealth bomber aircraft.
this to be at best an “associative connotation,” requiring a viewer to
352
use her imagination to make the connection.
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s determination that the mark
353
was not just descriptive.
Stoller also made various arguments based on Sutech’s use of the
354
STEALTH mark before its application. Specifically, Stoller argued
that Sutech had only used the mark “Sutech Stealth,” and not
355
“stealth” on its own. The Federal Circuit noted that because Sutech
had filed an intent-to-use application, which does not rely on or

344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 16:37 (4th ed. 2006)).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 957.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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require past use, Stoller’s arguments regarding defective past use
356
were entirely inapposite.
Stoller next contended that Sutech’s mark was unregistrable
357
because it was functional.
The Federal Circuit noted that the bar
on obtaining trademark protection for structural features was
358
Because Stoller’s argument
inapplicable to word marks.
359
misinterprets the relevant law, the Federal Circuit rejected it.
Finally, Stoller argued that Sutech was not entitled to register the
STEALTH word mark due to likelihood of confusion, claiming that
he owned twenty-six registered trademarks that incorporated the
360
361
word “stealth.”
As in El Encanto, Inc. v. La Tortilla Factory, Inc.,
discussed supra, this argument turned on Stoller’s compliance with 37
362
C.F.R. § 2.122(d).
The Board determined that Stoller had
“established in this record neither use of the pleaded marks nor
ownership of any validly subsisting federal registrations,” and so
concluded that Stoller had “failed to show the requisite standing or
363
priority of use on which to base his likelihood of confusion claim.”
The Board noted that Stoller had submitted copies of his registration
certificates but that “those copies [did] not indicate the current status
364
or title of the registrations, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d).”
Thus, the Board concluded that Stoller failed to prove that he used
the “stealth” mark, or that he currently owned or registered the
365
marks bearing that term.
On appeal, however, Stoller additionally asserted that Sutech
stipulated to his current ownership of registered marks in the notice
366
of reliance that was entered into the record before the Board.
In
the notice of reliance, Sutech stipulated to “[t]he true and correct
copy of the list of attached STEALTH Federal Trademark
Registrations which are owned by Leo Stoller and herein relied upon
367
in support of the Opposer’s Notice of Opposition.”
This list
included a reference to U.S. Reg. No. 2,024,889 for the mark “THE
368
STEALTH” for lawn sprinklers. The Federal Circuit noted that “on
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 957-58.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id.
201 F. App’x 773 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See supra text accompanying notes 313-339.
Stoller, 199 F. App’x at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 958-59.
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its face the notice of reliance appears to indicate that Sutech
conceded that Mr. Stoller owns the marks listed in the attachment to
369
the notice of reliance.” The court thus held that:
[b]ecause the Board’s opinion does not mention the notice of
reliance or the stipulation contained in it, we cannot determine
whether the Board overlooked that evidence or concluded for
some reason that it does not satisfy the requirement that Mr.
Stoller prove current ownership of the federally registered marks
370
on which he bases his claim of likelihood of confusion.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded to the Board, directing
it “to consider whether Sutech stipulated to Mr. Stoller’s rights in the
‘stealth’ marks referred to in [Stoller’s] notice of opposition and
whether this stipulation was sufficient to satisfy [Stoller’s] burden to
371
prove his current ownership of registered ‘stealth’ marks.”
The
court noted that if the Board found the stipulation sufficient, it would
then have to address the merits of Stoller’s likelihood of confusion
372
claim. As of the writing of this Article, no action has been taken by
the Board upon remand.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s trademark decisions for the year 2006
produced some noteworthy precedent. Among the more important
rulings was the Federal Circuit’s adoption of a rule from the D.C.
Circuit that plant varietal names are to be considered generic and
unregistrable. Additionally, the court had an opportunity to offer its
guidance on an important issue in trade dress law—how to
distinguish product configuration from product packaging for the
purposes of registrability. In its other decisions, the court reaffirmed
principles it had previously set out in its case law and affirmed the
decisions by the Board, the U.S. District Court and the ITC. As for its
unpublished opinions, although three of the four dealt with the
application of the DuPont likelihood of confusion factors—the most
common issue in trademark law, and perhaps why the court chose
not to publish these opinions—one of them pertained to an
unregistered mark and another case involved the doctrine of foreign
equivalents.

369.
370.
371.
372.

Id. at 959.
Id.
Id.
Id.

